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Abstract 
In this paper, we focus on bargaining within male–female pairs, the most pervasive partnership 
in humankind. We analyze data from an ultimatum game played by Greek subjects. Parallel to 
this, we introduce a one-way communication protocol according to which the responders can 
send short messages to the receivers, after making their decisions. The analysis shows that 
gender and message effects exist and that males are more effective bargainers.  
Keywords: bargaining; communication; gender effect; message effect; ultimatum game 
JEL Classification: C70; C90; C91; C92   
1. Introduction 
 
When focusing on partnerships of different genders, it is usually assumed that men are in charge 
while women have to bargain to receive their share (Meisenbach, 2010). In this paper, we study 
the bargaining ability and the role of each gender on both the responder and proposer positions 
in inter-gender pairs playing ultimatum games in the lab.   
Concerning the role of gender in the ultimatum game, Eckel & Grossman (2001) found that 
women appeared to be indifferent on the gender of the other player and that they were more 
generous than men. In the one-shot ultimatum game experiment conducted by Solnick (2001), 
the offers made to female players by both sexes were lower and the responders of both sexes 
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intended to accept lower offers when facing female proposers. Moreover, in the literature there 
is evidence (Sutter et al., 2009) that in pairs of the same gender there was much more 
competition and retaliation and thus lower efficiency than in mixed-gender pairs. Concerning 
the influence of gender pairing, Ben-Ner et al. (2004) find that women give significantly less 
to women than to men and persons of unknown gender. Furthermore, women paired with 
women almost never fail to reach an agreement, which is interpreted as solidarity (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2001). In our experiment we try to observe the behavior of Greek subjects on the 
aforementioned topics. 
In this study, we focused on an ultimatum game between different genders, giving the 
responders the possibility to send a short open-type message to the proposers expressing their 
feelings about the offer they received after submitting their decision. Although there was no 
limitation at the length of each message, the participants were instructed at the beginning of 
each session to keep them short and compendious. We chose to insert virtual communication 
into our experiment because we wanted to compare the changes, if any, it produces in the 
subjects’ behavior between the pre- and the post-message stage. As Winter & Zamir (1997) 
state, the proposers adapt their offers to the responders’ rejection and the responders adapt their 
rejections to the proposers’ behavior.  
The innovation of the current study is that there were used only pairs of different gender 
aiming to observe potential gender differences emerging when players are faced with the 
opposite gender. Furthermore, the introduction of communication between players in 
combination with the above structure makes this design unique, given the fact that very few 
bargaining experiments have been conducted under this scenario.  
 
2. Experimental design 
 
The results reported here were obtained from fourteen 60-period sessions of an 
ultimatum game played by 104 undergraduate students. In each session, the subjects were 
assigned the role either of the proposer or the responder according to their gender. Yet, subjects 
of the same gender had the same role throughout each session. Every participant was provided 
with written instructions. The experiment was designed and executed using the z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher, 2007).  
In each period, the proposer’s task was to place an offer of €X, which could be any 
amount between €0 and €20, in steps of €0.1. Random proposer–responder pairs were formed 
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within fixed, stable and independent, matching groups. The subjects were located in the same 
room but were unaware of the subject with whom they were to bargain. A responder who was 
randomly selected to be matched with a proposer received an offer and was called to accept or 
reject it. In the case of acceptance, the responder gained €X and the proposer €20-Χ. Otherwise, 
they both earned nothing. In order to prevent cumulative wealth effects, subjects were paid 
according to their earnings in one period randomly specified at the end of the session. 
Furthermore, due to limitation of funding only 80% of the subjects, randomly chosen in each 
session, were paid according to this rule and this was announced to them beforehand.  
Every session included 4 stages depending on the role of each gender in the game as 
well as the presence or absence of communication and had the structure presented in Table 1. 
As presented in this Table, all the female subjects were entering in the experiment with the role 
of proposer for 30 rounds (15 with and 15 without communication) while for these rounds the 
male subjects had the role of responder. For the rest 30 rounds these roles were reverse. We 
followed this pattern of role changing in order to prevent any potential learning behavior. The 
female subjects had always the role of proposer at the beginning of the experiment and after the 
completion of the first 30 rounds they never returned to this role. As a consequence they never 
had the opportunity to make biased offers based on their former experience on both roles. The 
same applies to male subjects with were always had the role of responder at beginning of the 
experiment.  
In the stages with communication the proposers were not allowed to respond to the 
message sent by the responders. In order to avoid ordering effects, the subjects were put in the 
above sub-sessions at random. We adopted this kind of experimental design in order to search 
for potential effects that the messages would have on the participants’ behavior in the sub-
sections with communication while in the same time searching for an impact of the message in 
the sub-sections without communication when the latter were conducted after the message sub-
sections. Because participants’ behavior could be affected by the short time between sub-
sessions, we made sure to have alternations in the sequence of the sections with and without 
communication in order to minimize this effect.  
3. Results and Discussion  
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the mean values of the proposed amounts of money, the earnings of the 
proposers as well as the responders calculated on the basis of successful transactions and the 
percentage of accepted offers by subject role and gender. As Table 2 shows, there is an increase 
of €1.49 in offers in the message-based sub-sessions, and a decrease of €0.43 in the amounts 
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offered in the message-based sub-sessions in rounds with male proposers (Wilcoxon test, 
p=0.007). 
3.1 Gender Effects 
The emergence of possible gender effects in the offers and earnings of subjects in sub-sessions 
with and without communication was checked with respect to either of the two roles. 
All the earnings were calculated exclusively on the basis of the successful transactions. 
The results are presented in Table 4. 
3.2 Message effects  
The existence of potential message effects was investigated in the amounts offered and 
in the subjects’ earnings in sub-sessions with and without communication for both roles. In 
order to do so, we read and analyzed all the messages sent by the responders and we categorized 
them based on the offered amount demanded by the responder, the amount that he was receiving 
and his reaction when we wasn’t getting the desired amount of money. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 5. 
From the analysis of the messages was found that when the responders were receiving 
the desired amount of money they tended to encourage the proposer to continue offering them 
the same amount of money or they applauded the offer with expressions like “well done”, “good 
offer”, “keep offering this amount” etc. On the contrary, when the offered amount was low and 
not acceptable they reacted by threatening the proposer of a possible further rejection of their 
offers if they don’t increase the offered amount. Expressions like “I need more”, “this is a low 
offer”, “you have to offer more” etc. were used.  
In order to ensure that differences in offers across pre- and post-message sub-sessions 
are not attributed to other factors, such as learning, we also examined and rejected the existence 
of learning behavior across the experiment sub-sessions, by analyzing the string of offers from 
each subject.  
Moreover, in order to analyze the acceptance or rejection decision with respect to 
gender roles and the presence (or absence) of messages, we used the following Probit model, 
in which the dependent variable is the participants’ decision and it takes the value 1 for 
acceptance and the value 0 for rejection. The results are displayed in Table 6. 
The interpretation of findings in Table 6 produces the following conclusions: 
1. An increase in offers will increase the probability of acceptance (P>|z|<0.001). 
2. Being a female increases the probability of accepting an offer (P>|z|=0.045). 
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3. The presence of post-decision messages increases the probability of accepting an offer 
(P>|z|=0.007). 
4. Being a female participant in the message-based sub-sessions decreases the probability 
of accepting an offer (P>|z|=0.043). 
4. Conclusion 
It has been conjectured that women may be discouraged from making riskier choices, 
in male-female groups, because they are inhibited by culturally driven norms about the 
appropriate mode of female behavior which is avoiding risk (Booth & Nolen, 2015). 
As the analysis of the results has shown, gender does play a role in the amount of money 
offered in both types of sub-sessions (i.e. message-based and message-free) as on the one hand, 
male subjects, opted to offer more in the sub-sessions without communication, whereas on the 
other, females were more generous in the sub-sessions with communication. Although we 
cannot reach a definite answer on gender effects in competitive environments, our finding differ 
from those of other studies in which it was found that female subjects  tend to reject offers more 
often and to make lower offers (García-Gallego et al., 2008; 2012). This generosity of the 
female subjects can be explained as a risk avoiding behavior given the fact that higher offers 
may reduce the level of rejection.  
In addition, a message effect also occurs affecting the level of offers. Females appeared 
more prone to changing their attitude and increasing their offers, when being aware of the other 
player’s intentions and wishes.  
Hence, it is apparent that the female participants in our experiment have used 
negotiation in a less aggressive manner than the male ones, while at the same time insisting on 
their demands. However, there is no evidence that women negotiate better than men. To sum 
up, the overall effect of the presence of communication is positive for male subjects, increasing 
their profits and their willingness to accept an offer.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Stages of the experiment   
Stages Rounds Proposer Responder Communication 
1 15 Female Male No 
2 15 Female Male Yes 
3 15 Male Female Yes 
4 15 Male Female No 
 
Table 2. Mean values of offers, earnings and acceptance frequencies with male proposers 
 
Offers Proposer earnings Responder earnings Acceptance 
Without message 9.16 10.11 9.88 82.94% 
With message 8.73 10.05 9.93 72.05% 
Overall 8.95 10.08 9.90 77.50% 
 
Table 3. Mean values of offers, earnings and acceptance frequencies with female proposers 
 
Offers Proposer earnings Responder earnings Acceptance 
Without message 7.62 11.54 8.45 67.80% 
With message 9.11 10.25 9.84 75.64% 
Overall 8.37 10.89 9.15 71.72% 
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Table 4. Gender effects 
Findings Without communication  With communication  
Finding 1: There is a 
gender effect on offers   
Higher amounts offered by 
males (p<0.001). 
Higher amounts offered by 
females (p<0.044). 
   
Finding 2: There is a 
gender effect on earnings 
in sub-sessions without 
communication 
1. Female proposers tended to 
gain more than the male ones 
(p<0.001). 
2. Male responders managed 
to earn more than females 
(p<0.001). 
No significant difference in the 
earnings of both genders in the 
role of the proposer and 
responder (p=0.565 and 
p=0.540, respectively). 
*p values referred to Mann–Whitney U test 
Table 5. Message effects  
Findings Female Male 
Finding 3: Different 
effects on the offers of 
each gender 
When proposers: increase of 
offered amounts in message-
based sub-sessions compared 
with those in message-free sub-
sessions (p<0.001). 
When proposers: increase 
in offers in the message-
based sub-sessions 
(p<0.001) and decrease in 
the amounts offered in the 
message-based sub-
sessions (p=0.007). 
   
Finding 4: A decrease in 
the proposer’s earnings in 
message-based sub-
sessions with female 
proposers 
When proposers: earnings 
decreased by 11.17% in the 
message-based sub-sessions 
(p<0.001) and increase of 
acceptance. 
When proposers: the 
decline of 0.5% in 
earnings presented in 
Table 3 is not statistically 
significant (p=0.873). 
   
Finding 5: The messages 
had a positive impact on 
the responders’ average 
earnings with males in the 
role of the responder 
increasing their earnings. 
When messages sent by females: 
no effect on their earnings 
(p=0.858). 
When messages sent by 
males: increase in their 
earnings (p<0.001). 
Finding 6: Female 
responders failed to 
convince male proposers 
to give them the amount of 
money they demanded 
Messages sent by the females 
implied that they had no strategy 
regarding their target of 
acceptable offers. 
Male proposers managed 
to receive almost always 
the desired amount of 
money, when sending 
their message. 
*p values referred to Wilcoxon test 
Table 6. Probit results for the probability of acceptance 
Decision Coefficient Est. 
Offer 0.14598** 
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Female 0.14924* 
Message 0.192** 
Female × Message -0.2083* 
Constant -0.6785 
Observations Pseudo R2 0.1282 
Prob>chi2 <0.001 
Offer: offered amount of money, Female: Female=1, Male=0, Message: 1 for the presence and 
0 for the absence of messages, Female × Message: dummy product of gender and message, 
Significance: **1%, *5% 
